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1. The Early View  
1.1. Logic as the Limit of the World 
In the Preface of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein writes that “the aim of the book is 
to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order 
to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable” (TLP, 
3, see TLP 4.114). According to the traditional interpretation of the book, this task is accomplished 
by presenting a theory of linguistic sense, known as the picture theory of meaning. According to 
this theory, every meaningful proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs. The picturing of 
states of affairs requires, in turn, referential relations between the elements of the picture and the 
pictured and the ability of those elements to be connected with one another as the elements of the 
pictured state of affairs are connected (TLP 2.1514, 2.151). This structural isomorphism between 
the picture and the pictured is made possible by logical form shared by language and the world 
(TLP 2.033, 2.17). When a proposition is analyzed into its simple elements, i.e. names, each name, 
as a constituent of the proposition, has a logical form that corresponds to the form of the object to 
which it refers in the state of affairs. The logical forms of objects thus ground the logical form of 
states of affairs as well as of the propositions depicting them. Hence, Wittgenstein writes, “Logic 





It follows from the Tractarian dictum, according to which meaningful propositions are 
pictures of possible states of affairs, that language is strictly factual. According to the Tractatus, all 
meaningful propositions are bipolar, capable of being true and capable of being false (TLP 2.21, 
4.023). Moreover, in the Tractarian account, “the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural 
science” (TLP 4.11). Hence, when Wittgenstein sets out to draw a limit to the expression of 
thought, this translates into the philosophical task of setting “limits to the much disputed sphere of 
natural science” (TLP 4.113). However, in its attempt to draw such limits, the practice of 
philosophy in the Tractatus cannot abide by its self-proclaimed standard, namely “to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science – i.e. something that has nothing to do 
with philosophy” (TLP 6.53). If the philosophical goal of the Tractatus is to delineate sense from 
nonsense by laying out the conditions for sense, those conditions are not among the facts 
expressible in language (TLP 2.172). One cannot step outside the bounds of thought to form meta-
thoughts on the preconditions of sense that would themselves satisfy those conditions. Instead, 
Wittgenstein claims, logical form is “shown” or “displayed” in propositions (TLP 2.172, 4.121–
4.122, 6.22). According to the traditional interpretation of the Tractatus, his is the reason why 
Wittgenstein declares his own propositions nonsensical (TLP 6.54).  
The status of logical form as the limit of language surfaces in Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
propositions of logic. Every imaginable state of affairs, i.e., every possibility, can be expressed in 
language, and there are no thoughts in the technical sense of the Tractatus indicating bipolarity that 
could not be expressed by means of propositions. However, there are two limiting cases of 
propositions that do not fulfill the standard of bipolarity but that are not nonsensical either. These 
are tautologies and contradictions. Tautologies are unconditionally true, while contradictions are 
true under no conditions. Hence, given that they fail to “restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or 
no”, tautologies and contradictions are senseless (sinnlos) (TLP 4.023). Nevertheless, as they still 





(unsinnig) (TLP 4.46–4.464). In Wittgenstein’s view, propositions of logic are tautologies. While 
they do not say anything about the contingent facts comprising reality, they show “the logic of the 
world” (TLP 4.462, 6.22). They show the pure contentless form of language and thereby reveal its 
limits (TLP 6.12). 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the limits of meaningful language leaves the Tractatus itself 
in a puzzling position. What are we to think of the program outlined by Wittgenstein if it renders 
the sentences of the Tractatus itself nonsensical pseudo-propositions? How are we supposed to 
understand those sentences if they fail to say anything about reality? Peter Hacker, perhaps the most 
prominent proponent of the traditional interpretation, argues that while the sentences of the 
Tractatus “fail to comply with the rules of logical grammar – logical syntax”, they still succeed in 
illuminating correct insights about the relation between language and the world. The harmony 
between the two, necessary for sense, “is shown by the features of our means of representation” 
(Hacker 2000, 355, 364). For Hacker, this means that “The Tractatus circumscribed the bounds of 
sense in order to make room for ineffable metaphysics” (Hacker 2001, 164). In other words, 
“Grammar, or logical syntax, is ineffably justified by reference to the metaphysical structure of the 
world” (Hacker 1986, 189; see also Hacker 2001, 152–153; Anscombe 1959; Pears 1987). 
The traditional interpretation has been criticized by a group of scholars defending the so-
called resolute reading of the Tractatus. One of the pivots of the ensuing debate has been the notion 
of a limit of language. Cora Diamond, James Conant, and others have argued that, instead of putting 
forth a general theory of meaning that entails such a limit, Wittgenstein aims at showing that there 
is no limit to our expressive capacities. Accordingly, for the resolute readers, there is no 
illuminating nonsense envisioned by the traditional interpretation. All nonsense is of the same kind, 
it is “einfach Unsinn”, “mere gibberish” (Diamond 2000, 159; Conant 2002, 424). Hence, given 
Wittgenstein’s statement of the nonsensicality of his own propositions we cannot so much as 





“imaginative activity” of taking its nonsensical sentences as meaningful just to realize how they 
“dissolve from inside” (Diamond 1991, 158; Goldfarb 1997, 66). Cora Diamond writes: “Are we 
going to keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we gesture at, however badly, 
when we speak of ‘the logical form of reality’, so that it, what we are gesturing at, is there but 
cannot be expressed in words? That is what I want to call chickening out.” (Diamond 1991, 181.) 
Juliet Floyd connects the point explicitly to the idea of a limit, writing: “[the Tractatus] conjures up 
limits over and over again, but only in order to break them, to show them up as false limits” (Floyd 
1998, 82; see also Conant 2002, 424). The resolute reading thus denies that Wittgenstein was 
committed to an idea of limits of language or to the corresponding distinction between saying and 
showing. Both notions must be thrown away together with the other nonsensical rungs of the ladder 
comprising the book (Conant 2002, 424; see TLP 6.54).  
The obvious motivation for the resolute reading is Wittgenstein’s statement about the 
nonsensicality of the sentences of the Tractatus (TLP 6.54). But there are at least two further 
reasons for the resolute critique of the traditional interpretation. First, the resolute readers object to 
the view of the Tractatus as prescribing a fixed logical syntax that would, in turn, limit our thought. 
They appeal to Wittgenstein’s statement: “Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition 
must have sense. And I say that any possible proposition is legitimately constructed, and, if it has 
no sense, that can only be because we have failed to give a meaning to one of its constituents” (TLP 
5.4733). The point of this remark, it is argued, is that nonsense results only from our failure to use 
our words in a meaningful way (Conant 2002, 411–414; Diamond 1991, 196–201). One could 
object, however, that in the remark in question Wittgenstein talks about possible propositions that 
are indeed all legitimately constructed. For a proponent of the traditional reading, the potential 
failure Wittgenstein identifies in the passage is not a failure to think logically. For if a proposition 
(thought) did not have logical form, it would not be a possible proposition (thought) in the first 





proposition already has a logical form, but the constituents of the proposition as a formal structure 
have not (yet) been given meaning (Bedeutung) by being projected onto reality (TLP 3.12–3.13, 
4.5; see Hacker 1986, 185).  
The idea of logic as a “straightjacket”, to borrow Floyd’s expression, “a uniquely fixed and 
explicit system” imprisoning thought and speech, against which the resolute reading has reacted, 
may be seen as arising from the reception of the Tractatus as a work written primarily in the 
tradition of Frege and Russell (Floyd 1998, 80–81). Both Frege and Russell were looking for an 
ideal language cashed out in a Begriffsschrift, a particular syntactic system of analysis. If the 
Tractatus is read as exclusively reflecting this tradition, then we seem to be left with two options: 
either Wittgenstein’s goal is to formulate such a system in order to limit our expression (as some 
formulations of the traditional reading suggest) or he outlines such a system only to reject it as 
nonsensical (as the resolute readers argue). Both readings run into difficulties with the text. The 
former view is difficult to align with Wittgenstein’s claim, often evoked as evidence for the resolute 
reading, that “all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical 
order” (TLP 5.5563). The latter view, in treating the majority of the Tractatus as outright 
unintelligible, runs the risk of “throwing away the baby together with the bathwater”, as Hacker has 
maintained (Hacker 2000, 369).  
However, several commentators have emphasized the difference between the philosophical 
projects of Wittgenstein on the one hand and Frege and Russell on the other. According to them, 
Wittgenstein does not aim at the construction of a specific formula language of pure thought, nor 
does he treat logic as a discipline describing abstract entities, psychological regularities, or the most 
general truths about reality (TLP 4.0312, 4.441, 5.4; see Kannisto 1986, 81; Glock 1992; 1996a, 
203; Glock 1996b, 198–199; McGinn 1999, 502, 508; Moyal-Sharrock 2007, 163; Floyd 2007, 





2.0121). Rather than prescribing how one ought to think, logic is concerned with the necessary 
preconditions for any possible language.   
Second, the resolute readers reject the traditional interpretation of logical form as grounded 
in ontology. For them, “our understanding of possibility is not ontologically based on some realm of 
the possible, but arises simply from our understanding of and our operating with the sensical 
sentences of our language” (Goldfarb 1997, 66). The resolute readers are not alone in objecting to 
the metaphysical interpretation of the foundation of the limits of language either. Commentators 
such as Peter Sullivan, Marie McGuinn, and Daniele Moyal Sharrock have defended interpretations 
of the status of logical form as more formal than metaphysical without, however, falling back on the 
resolute view of the Tractarian sentences as mere gibberish. Sullivan has argued that Wittgenstein 
rejects both the realist, “object-centered” explanation of the harmony between language and reality 
as well as its idealist counterpart that locates the necessary form of the world in the subject 
(Sullivan 1996). McGinn and Moyal-Sharock have emphasized the elucidatory function of the 
Tractarian sentences as directing our attention to the essential in our language without the need to 
ground it in something absolute outside of language (McGinn 1999, 2007; Moyal-Sharrock 2007).  
Some of the worries raised by the resolute readers and others against the metaphysical 
interpretation have been addressed also by another, long-established interpretation of the Tractatus 
that gives further weight to the notion of a limit of language by connecting the term to its arguably 
Kantian origin. The Kantian interpretation shares the traditional reading’s interpretative 
commitment to what the so-called picture theory requires and implies. But by contrast to the 
traditional view – and in this particular respect in consonance with the criticisms of the realist 
reading of the Tractatus – the Kantian interpretation (or at least some variants of it) does not take 
logical form to answer to an independently established ontological order. The limits of language 
and of the world are determined by logical form, but this form is taken to be first and foremost the 





grounded in ontology, but the other way around. As Wittgenstein writes: “A thought contains the 
possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too” (TLP 3.02).  
According to the Kantian interpretation, Wittgenstein’s statement that “logic is 
transcendental” ought to be read in a specifically Kantian sense (TLP 6.13). The logic of the 
Tractatus resembles Kant’s transcendental logic that deals with forms of thought that are at the 
same time forms of reality and has a role similar to Kant’s transcendental, limiting, conditions for 
the possibility of experience (cf. CPR A57, P 350–365). However, by contrast to Kant, Wittgenstein 
does not leave any room for synthetic a priori, i.e., for meaningful propositions about states affairs 
that are true a priori (TLP 2.225; see Stenius 1960, 214; Hacker 1986, 22; Glock 1996a, 132; Glock 
1996b, 200). As a condition of sense, logical form is that which makes the truth and falsity of 
propositions possible. Hence, when Wittgenstein writes that “there is no a priori order of things”, 
the Kantian reading takes him to refer to the contingency of facts expressible by propositions and 
not to logical form that grounds their possibility (TLP 5.634). This is to say that logic, as a formal 
condition of thought, is a priori and this is manifest precisely in the impossibility of illogical 
thought (TLP 5.4731). Moreover, by contrast to what Sullivan calls the “object-centered view” thus 
referring to the realist interpretation of the limits of language, the Kantian reading emphasizes form 
also in the case of objects (Sullivan 1996, 207). After all, Wittgenstein claims that objects, as the 
unalterable substance of the world, are form as well as content (TLP 2.024–2.0271). If this form is 
primarily the form of thought, as the Kantian reading argues, then the Tractatus’s appeal to objects 
as the substance of the world does not necessarily entail a commitment to an ontologically grounded 
limit of language. “Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects”, as Wittgenstein writes, but 
from the transcendental perspective the form of this reality is not independent of the form of 
thought (TLP 5.5561; see Kannisto 1986, 138–143).  
In the Kantian reading, then, the entire project of the Tractatus to draw the limits of 





transcendental, i.e. necessary and limiting, conditions for their possibility. But this just means that 
one does not have to run together the notions of an ideal language and that of a limit of language. 
Ordinary language, just as it is, is already structured by logical form that we know from our own 
thought. And to realize this means to realize that “The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world” (TLP 5.6).  
 
1.2. Subject as the Limit of the World 
In the Tractatus, the notion of a limit is not used exclusively in relation to logic. Wittgenstein 
claims that there is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self that is intimately connected 
to the limits of language and of the world. The philosophical self in question is not the empirical 
subject that we encounter among the facts of the world. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, “there is 
no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas” (TLP 5.631). However, the philosophical 
self surfaces as a limiting condition of the world: “The philosophical self is not the human body, or 
the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the 
world – not a part of it” (TLP 5.641, see also 5.632). Hacker has argued that Wittgenstein’s 
conception of the philosophical self resembles the transcendental subject that we find in Kant’s and 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. As pointed out by Hacker, Wittgenstein illustrates the notion in 
terminology clearly reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s writing. The philosophical self is not a 
Cartesian thinking ego, but rather the subject to whom the world is given. Hence, while everything I 
experience – i.e., facts of the world – is a posteriori, that my experiences belong to me is a priori. 
The metaphysical subject is a limit of the world in this precise sense. (Hacker 1986, Ch. 4.)  
In the Tractatus, the metaphysical subject has a prominent role in relation to two themes, 
namely, solipsism and ethics. According to Wittgenstein, the insight that “the limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world” shows that “what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot 





Wittgenstein’s conception of language to the solipsist’s correct insight reflects the manner in which 
names, as the constituents of propositions, acquire their meanings. According to Hacker, 
propositional signs become meaningful only through the speaker’s acts of intention. Hence, sense 
presupposes the metaphysical subject as the subject who means something by the otherwise dead 
propositional signs or understands them by projecting them into reality (TLP 3.11–3.13; Hacker 
1986, 73–80, 100; Hacker 2001, 149). For Hacker, this is the main reason for Wittgenstein’s 
characterization of language as “that language which alone I understand” (TLP 5.62). But if one 
rejects Hacker’s realist interpretation of the Tractatus in favor of the Kantian reading, one could 
argue further that the solipsist’s correct insight has an even more fundamental source. For if the 
harmony between language and reality is grounded in the necessary form of though, as some 
proponents of the Kantian interpretation have suggested, then the correctness of transcendental 
solipsism would readily follow. Language would be “my language” not merely because “by my 
correlating the components of the picture with the objects, it comes to represent a situation”, as 
Wittgenstein writes in 1914, but also because the other necessary condition for sense, namely, 
logical form, originates with the metaphysical subject (NB, 33–34; see Kannisto 1986, 124–130).  
A completely different take on Wittgenstein’s treatment of the metaphysical subject is 
given in Sullivan’s seminal article “‘Truth’ in Solipsism and Wittgenstein’s rejection of the A 
Priori” (1996). According to Sullivan, Wittgenstein is indeed concerned with transcendental 
idealism in the passages of the Tractatus that discuss the metaphysical subject (TLP 5.6–5.641). 
However, Sullivan argues, instead of yielding to the idealist temptation, Wittgenstein aims at 
disarming the very position along with any substantial notion of a priori. This is not to say that, on 
Sullivan’s account, Wittgenstein was a realist. Rather, Wittgenstein’s goal is to find a middle way 
between the realist and the idealist positions, which both aim at offering a philosophical 
justification for the harmony between language and the world by grounding it in either ontology or 





Sullivan writes, “the notions of language and world which 5.6 begins are the interdependent notions 
of formal totalities” (Sullivan 1996, 209). Accordingly, we should think of the I as an equally 
empty, formal notion (ibid., 211). 
The other theme closely related to Wittgenstein’s notion of a metaphysical subject as the 
limit of the world is ethics. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states that the facts of the world are 
contingent and therefore lack value (TLP 6.4–6.41). Accordingly, ethics cannot be expressed in 
language, which is in the business of stating such contingent facts (TLP 6.42). In parallel with his 
claim about the transcendentality of logic, Wittgenstein writes that “ethics is transcendental” (TLP 
6.421). By contrast to logic, the origin of which is wanting conclusive textual evidence and subject 
to scholarly debate, ethics is, at least in the Notebooks 1916, explicitly claimed to “only enter 
through the subject” (NB 79). In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein writes that while a thinking subject is 
an illusion, the willing subject is not (NB 80). Moreover, the will in question is good or evil (NB 
80; see NB 73, 76). In Wittgenstein’s account, the world is independent of the will, but this does not 
render ethics illusory (TLP 6.373, 5.1362). While deprived of the ability to influence the facts of the 
world, the willing subject can alter its limits: “If the good and the bad exercise of the will does alter 
the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by 
means of language” (TLP 6.43).  
In his remarks on ethics, Wittgenstein is again digressing the bounds of meaningful 
language as dictated by the Tractatus (TLP 6.373– 6.522). While the traditional interpretation has 
been inclined to question whether Wittgenstein’s remarks on value coherently fit into the broader 
framework of the Tractatus, the resolute reading has stressed the ethical import of the Tractatus, but 
independently of the internal evidence provided by the Tractatus (Hacker 1986, 105; Conant 2005, 
69–70). In contrast to both, the Kantian interpretation has stressed the fact that the notions evoked 
by Wittgenstein in this context are the very same notions that for Kant lie outside the bounds of 





judgment. These notions include ethics, aesthetics, will, freedom, God, immortality of the soul, and 
religious faith, and the world as a whole (TLP 6.373–6.45; see Stenius 1960, 222; Moore 1987; 
Moore 2013, 251–253; Moore 2007, 184–187). For Wittgenstein, these notions comprise the 
“mystical” that lies beyond the limits of meaningful language.  
Again, the difference between Kant and Wittgenstein results from Kant’s view that, while 
we cannot have knowledge of free will, God, or eternity, and while attempts to establish claims to 
such knowledge will only lead to dogmatic metaphysics, reason can form expressible thoughts of 
such notions even if these do not correspond to anything in empirical reality. By contrast, for the 
early Wittgenstein, who limits meaningful language and thought to propositions about the 
contingent facts of empirical reality, the aforementioned notions must be “passed over in silence” 
(TLP 7; see Stenius 1960, 218). Nevertheless, in accordance with Kant, whose motivation to draw 
the limits of experience by reflecting their necessary, transcendental conditions was to “make room 
for faith” (CPR BXXX), Wittgenstein, too, claims to draw the limits of language to safeguard value. 
He writes to Ludwig von Ficker: “the point of the book is ethical. […] I wanted to write that my 
book consists of two parts: one of which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And 
precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were 
by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way.” 
(Luckhardt 1979, 94–95.) 
 
2. The Later Views 
In 1931, Wittgenstein connects the idea of a limit of language explicitly to the Kantian tradition. He 
writes: “The limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence. (We are 
involved here with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy.)” (CV, 13). Wittgenstein is 





words still echo the idea of logic as the inexpressible condition of sense. While every possible fact 
is expressible in language, we cannot step above our language to describe its formal correspondence 
with the world in “another language dealing with the structure of the first language”, as Russell in 
his Introduction to the Tractatus had – to Wittgenstein’s annoyance – suggested (TLP, xxii).  
Nevertheless, by the 1930s Wittgenstein’s early conception of language as a unified 
totality, limited by an immutable logical form and crystallized in the notion of a general 
propositional form that every meaningful proposition must meet, has become the target of 
Wittgenstein’s criticism (TLP 4.001, 4.5, 5.471, 5.4711; cf. PI §23–24, 108, 114). In 1930 
Wittgenstein states, still echoing the Tractatus: “What sort of harmony must there be between 
thoughts & the world? Only that the thought must have logical form; & without this it wouldn’t be a 
thought.” (M, 4:18.) But now he adds: “What language must have in common is contained in rules 
of grammar” (M, 4:18). By contrast to the logical form of the Tractatus, grammar involves elements 
that are not purely syntactical, but incorporate features that at the outset look empirical. Moreover, 
the rules of grammar are not immutable, but they may be abandoned, provided that we are willing 
to give up the use they have made possible: “What I say of grammar (including inference) is always 
arbitrary rules: they needn’t be used, but if we change them, we can’t use them in this way” (M, 
5:88). So even as arbitrary rules, the rules of grammar make the use of language possible. 
Wittgenstein also discards the Tractarian assumption of simple objects as the termini of 
logical analysis and (arguably) grounding the logical form of the world (TLP 2.022). This idea, he 
now claims, was a digression into thinking along the lines of empirical science – a philosophical 
confusion that he himself had warned against (M, 5:30, 7:39, 7:88, 7:92; cf. TLP 4.111). 
Wittgenstein states repeatedly that the rules of grammar are arbitrary or autonomous, not answering 
to anything over and above grammar itself (see e.g. M, 5:87, 5:91, 6:34). Yet, in accord with the 
Tractatus, according to which “logic must look after itself”, Wittgenstein still claims that the rules 





from language into reality correspond rules of grammar: & there is no possible justification for 
these: because any language by which we could try to justify would have to have a grammar itself: 
no description of world can justify rules of grammar” (M, 5:54). Moreover, Wittgenstein connects 
the point at which justifications have been exhausted to the limit of language. He says: “Philosophy 
may expect to arrive at fundamental propositions. But great event to which we come is the coming 
to the boundary of language: there we can’t ask anything further” (M, 5:28). Wittgenstein suggests 
that grammatical systems may be approached either “discursively”, i.e., as calculi that may be 
taught to another, or “intuitively”, i.e., “taking something in as a whole at a glance” (M, 8:59). This 
latter perspective that “overlooks” (überseht) a grammatical system as a whole limited by its 
constitutive rules may be seen as precursor of Wittgenstein’s mature conception of the 
philosophical method as one that provides “surveyable representations” (übersichtliche 
Darstellung) of grammar (M, 9:33, 9:38; PI §122).  
As these examples from the 1930s serve to show, Wittgenstein’s rejection of central 
elements of his early account does not mean that the notion of a limit disappears from his imagery. 
Instead, it is appropriated to the new idea of grammatical systems, and later, in the Philosophical 
Investigations, to his mature treatment of concepts and language-games. Given Wittgenstein’s 
increasingly flexible conception of grammar, the boundaries he talks about become equally flexible. 
Nevertheless, even in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the idea of a limit of language is connected to 
themes that figure in the Tractatus as that which transcends the empirical. Such themes include 
grammar, the practice of philosophy, aesthetics, and religion. Of ethics, the later Wittgenstein 
remains more or less silent, except for his 1933 remark, reminiscent of the Tractatus’s equation 
between ethics and aesthetics: “Practically everything I say of ‘beautiful’ applies in a slightly 
different way to ‘good’” (M, 9:18). 
According to the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy, the key 





each constituted by their respective sets of grammatical rules (PI §104). The meaning of a word 
should not be understood as an object the name stands for, but is best characterized as the word’s 
use in the context of a language-game (PI §43). The point of using the word “language-game”, 
Wittgenstein writes, is to “emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or 
of a form of life” (PI §23). The rules of language are thus not fixed or tabulated into a manual, but 
given in the practice of using language and transmitted by training and examples (PI §§198–199, 
208–210, 355). Moreover, as the rules of language are to be found in the “customs, uses, and 
institutions” of a linguistic community, they are subject to change and cultural variation (PI §199). 
Accordingly, the idea of a limit of language becomes more flexible, historically changing, and 
indefinite: a riverbed ever changing with the fluctuation of water rather than a fence set up once and 
for all (see OC §§97–99). Wittgenstein also points out that when a limit is drawn, it is drawn for a 
particular purpose. Discussing the limits of concepts, Wittgenstein writes: “For I can give the 
concept ‘number’ rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word ‘number’ for a rigidly limited 
concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by frontier. And this 
is how we do use the word “game”. For how is the concept game bounded? What still counts as a 
game and what no longer does? Can you give it a boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so 
far been drawn. (But that never troubled you when you used the word ‘game’.)” (PI §68). Words are 
meaningful as long as they have a use in our language, and that use does not have to be fixed in 
advance by strict boundaries formulated by means of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
In spite his new emphasis on linguistic practices and the human form of life, the later 
Wittgenstein still adheres to the distinction between the empirical and the grammatical (TLP 3.33, 
5.552, 6.111; PI §§90, 109, 251, 295, 458). While the notions of truth and falsity apply to empirical 
statements and opinions, they do not apply to grammar. Rather, we take the grammatical for granted 
in our use of language. Indeed, it is this taking-for-granted that makes the truth and falsity of 





2007, 157). It is important to notice that, by contrast to Wittgenstein’s early conception of logical 
form to be uncovered by analysis, the status of the grammatical as necessary does not arise from a 
source independent of our use of language. It is the way in which certain propositions are actually 
used in our language, their role in our language, that gives grammatical propositions their status as 
necessities: “To accept a proposition as unshakably certain – I want to say – means to use it as a 
grammatical rule: this removes uncertainty from it” (RFM III: 39). Moreover, the status of a given 
proposition as either empirical or grammatical may change based on its use. As Hans-Johann Glock 
notes, “we can remove a sentence from the scope of empirical refutation by using it normatively 
rather than descriptively” (Glock 1996b, 208). This is not to say that grammar is matter of mere 
opinion. Wittgenstein himself makes the point explicitly by writing: “‘So are you saying that human 
agreement decided what is true and what is false?’ – It is what human beings say that is true and 
false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of 
life.” (PI §241). Without such basic agreement, taken for granted in our use of language, the 
possibility of making true and false statements would evaporate. 
In spite of drawing their status as necessities from our use, grammatical rules provide the 
criteria by which we distinguish between correct and incorrect uses of words and, accordingly, 
between understanding and misunderstanding. The understanding of words and sentences is the 
ability to follow the rules constitutive of their use, manifest in the speaker’s ability to justify her 
linguistic usages by appeal to the rules (PI §§185–242). It is not yet enough that my behavior 
conforms to the rule that is constitutive of the game providing the context of the use. If I 
understand, then my behavior ought to be internally related to the rule so that, for example, I can 
appeal to the rule in explaining my application thereof. The rule is, as the traditional interpretation 
given in Peter Hacker’s and Gordon Baker’s commentary puts it, “involved in [my] activity as a 
reason or part of a reason for acting thus-and-so” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 138). If this were not the 





standing in need of a criterion to distinguish it from misunderstanding. However, Wittgenstein 
states repeatedly that reasons come to an end. That “once I have exhausted the justifications, I have 
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’.” (PI 
§217.) Here, we meet the limit of language again in the form of the bedrock that stops the chain of 
justification. Wittgenstein writes: “A reason can only be given within a game. The links of a chain 
of reasons come to an end, at the boundary of the game” (PG, 97; see also PI §§326, 482, 485). At 
the boundary of the game there is no further justification to be found, nor any room to meaningfully 
question whether one ought to follow these rules. Instead, “when I follow the rule, I do not choose. I 
follow the rule blindly” (PI §219).  
What Wittgenstein means by the bedrock and the notion of blind rule-following has been a 
topic of intense scholarly discussion. As in the case of the Tractatus, the main points of 
disagreement concern the ways in which the notion of grammar and the nature of philosophy in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy ought to be understood. Some commentators object to the 
traditional, “normativist” or rule-based interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy just 
outlined. An early critic of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on rules and games was Rush Rhees, who took 
Wittgenstein game analogy to be giving a misleading view about the nature of human 
communication (Rhees 1959–1960, 182). Later, proponents of the “resolute” or “therapeutic” 
interpretation have argued that it is in fact a mistake to attribute a rule-based account of language to 
Wittgenstein himself as well. Rule-bound games may be useful objects of comparison for language, 
to be used in “piecemeal treatment” of philosophical problems, but to take Wittgenstein to be 
advocating a rule-based conception of language is to fall guilty of philosophical dogmatism against 
which Wittgenstein warned (Kuusela 2008; Conant 2011). According to the therapeutic reading, the 
traditional reading mistakenly takes the philosopher’s job to be to “police the borders between sense 
and nonsense” by tabulating rules of grammar (Morris 2006, 1). Instead, it is argued, the goals of 





confusions without any generally valid philosophical arguments or claims (Baker 2006, 109–118, 
205–222). 
But to align the anti-normativist interpretation with Wittgenstein’s undeniable focus on rules 
is difficult. Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations that “If rule became exception, 
and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – our normal 
language-games would thereby lose their point” (PI §142). And even more emphatically in 
manuscript 164: “Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game. It 
characterizes what we call description” (RFM, VI-28). Rather than indicating a contrast between the 
descriptive approach in philosophy and the notion of a rule, these remarks suggest that Wittgenstein 
himself took description and rules to belong together. What is to be described, for a particular 
philosophical purpose, is a language-game, a rule-governed structure among other structures that 
together comprise our language (PI §108). Besides, what is sometimes highlighted as the distinctive 
feature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, namely, its critical stance towards philosophical theories, 
is a methodological commitment present already in the Tractatus (TLP 4.112, PI § 109).  
The necessity of taking something for granted in order to think meaningfully becomes 
particularly dominant in Wittgenstein’s latest work, published in On Certainty. Here, Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of “certainties”, propositions that we treat as immune to doubt, broadens the notion of 
grammatical rules to cover sentences that express basic certainties of our world-view. Such basic 
certainties include assurance of matters that G. E. Moore treated as knowledge, for example, that “I 
have two hands”. Wittgenstein does not accept Moore’s position, given that he takes knowledge to 
presuppose the possibility of justification, missing in the case of basic certainties where neither 
doubt nor the demand of justification arises. Rather, the possibility of justifying non-basic beliefs 
(empirical beliefs and everyday opinions) as well as the possibility of false beliefs is grounded in 
our taking for granted certainties that themselves are ungrounded (see e.g. OC §§94–95, 105, 136). 





formulations of our basic certainties, as nonsense. Given that grammatical rules have no use within 
the bounds of a language-game, “they have no sense; they determine sense” (Moyal-Sharrock 2017, 
558). In this respect, the “hinge propositions” discussed in On Certainty may be seen as successors 
of the sentences of the Tractatus: both are useless in language, as “their only use is to delineate and 
elucidate the correct use of language” (Moyal-Sharrock 2007, 170). Accordingly, to doubt basic 
certainties is “logically impossible” and amounts to “having lost the bounds of sense” (OC §454; 
Moyal-Sharrock 2017, 549). While we can formulate a grammatical rule for philosophical purposes, 
in the actual use of language they say nothing. This is why Wittgenstein writes: “‘There are 
physical objects’ is nonsense” (OC §35). 
In the Tractatus, the task of philosophy was one of drawing the limits of language to 
demarcate sense from nonsense. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that the 
task of the philosopher is to describe language games, i.e., practice-laden ways of using language, 
without explaining or justifying them in any way (PI §§109, 124–129). The descriptive approach 
does not render philosophical investigation empirical, because what directs the description is a 
philosophical problem. Instead of phenomena, philosophical investigation is, as Wittgenstein 
writes, “directed towards the possibilities of phenomena” (PI §90, cf. TLP 2.0121). This is what 
makes the investigation grammatical rather than empirical (PI §187). Again, Wittgenstein connects 
the practice of philosophy understood as grammatical investigation to the limits of language: “The 
results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the 
understanding has got by running up against the limit of language. They – these bumps – make us 
see the value of that discovery” (PI §119). But while the mature Wittgenstein still treats the limits of 
grammar as that which excludes nonsense, he now emphasizes that such limits are always drawn for 
a particular purpose: “To say ‘This combination of words has no sense’ excludes it from the sphere 
of language, and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary, it may 





In Wittgenstein’s later view, then, the limits of language are reached at the boundary of a 
language-game, where justifications made possible by the rules constitutive of that game have been 
exhausted and we simply take the rules themselves for granted. At this boundary or bedrock, we can 
only act or else, for purposes of philosophical clarification, describe the game in question (PI §261). 
Particularly poignant cases of reasons coming to an end surface in Wittgenstein’s later discussions 
of religion and aesthetics. In his lectures on aesthetics and religious belief, Wittgenstein focuses on 
cases where one cannot convince one’s interlocutor by appeal to explicit rule-formulations. While 
aesthetic judgments call for reasons, the kind of reason-giving we find in aesthetics takes the form 
of comparisons between a particular aesthetic choice and something else, intended to guide the 
interlocutor to see the aesthetic phenomenon from a particular perspective. But this just means that I 
cannot force another to adopt my judgment by arguments: “If when I’ve made you see what I see, it 
doesn’t appeal to you, there is an end” (M, 9:31).  
We find a similar end in reason-giving in Wittgenstein’s later discussion of religious belief. 
One might expect Wittgenstein to emphasize the role of the linguistic community and tradition for 
the possibility of religious language, given the importance placed on the linguistic community and 
the human form of life in his later thought. But interestingly, in his lectures on religious belief 
Wittgenstein discusses a gulf that may appear between a religious person and himself as somebody 
who does not share the “pictures” that lay down the foundation for the believer’s world view (LC, 
55). According to Wittgenstein, it is impossible for him to contradict the person, as he might in 
cases of ordinary empirical disagreements (LC, 55). Whether this means that the believer and the 
non-religious person “play different language-games”, each limited by their own rules and hence 
not allowing for a translation, has been subject to debate. Those drawing on the legacy of Rush 
Rhees have emphasized that in spite of Wittgenstein’s spatial metaphor, suggesting an unbridgeable 
gap between different language-games, “levels”, or “planes” the disputants inhabit, the non-





by the more traditional interpretation have taken Wittgenstein to argue religious beliefs are 
“immune from falsification and from verification” and in this respect on a par with grammatical 
rules (Hyman 2001, 7; see Schroeder 2007, 443–445, 459; Pritchard 2018).  
 
3. The Form and Content of This Volume 
This collection brings together twelve articles that approach Wittgenstein’s notion of the limits of 
language from a variety of perspectives. With the exception of A. W. Moore’s article, “The Bounds 
of Nonsense”, which has been published in Moore’s volume Language, World, and Limits: Essays 
in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics (OUP, 2019), all articles have been newly 
commissioned. Part I, Logic, Self, and Value in Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy, consists of three 
chapters that address the notion of a limit in the three roles assigned to it in the Tractatus: logic, the 
philosophical self, and ethics as limits of language and of the world. Part II, Grammar, Linguistic 
Community, and Value in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, follows the same overall pattern. It 
begins with four different interpretations of Wittgenstein’s later treatment of the limits of language, 
continues to two contributions reflecting the potential limitations that arise from our anthropocentric 
perspective, and closes with three articles that address themes that Wittgenstein associates with the 
limit of language throughout his career, namely, religion, aesthetics, and ethics. 
In his article “The Bound of Nonsense”, A. W. Moore examines the distinction between 
sense and nonsense in the Tractatus. He begins by addressing Cora Diamond’s and Michael 
Kremer’s denial of the view that, according to the Tractatus, all pseudo-propositions are 
nonsensical. Noting that such a denial, in exempting certain pseudo-propositions from the charge of 
nonsensicality, could exacerbate the mystery of why the pseudo-propositions in the Tractatus are 
not among those to be exempted, Moore proceeds to introduce what he calls the Principal 
Distinction. This is the distinction, undeniably fundamental for the project of the Tractatus, 





pseudo-propositions. Moore argues that, for Wittgenstein, our understanding of what it is for 
something to be a truth-valueless pseudo-proposition is not independent of our understanding of the 
notion of a proposition with a truth-value. Rather, a pseudo-proposition without a truth-value is an 
item that has the false appearance of being a proposition with a truth-value. The article closes with 
an appendix, comparing the Tractatus’s truth-valueless pseudo-propositions with Kant’s idea of an 
“empty thought”, indicating an interesting parallel but also an important contrast between the two. 
In his article “Solipsism and the Graspability of Fact”, Colin Johnston sets out to provide 
an answer to the hard question of what Wittgenstein means by stating that “the limits of my 
language are the limits of my world” (TLP 5.6). His argument begins by suggesting that the 
Tractarian conception of a fact is essentially Fregean: as in Frege, truth’s “pride of place” dictates 
that a fact is at base a possible truth. This suggestion is subsequently justified by means of a thought 
that the subject makes no sense of content to her thinking going beyond in kind that of a truth or 
falsehood. This thought further includes, however, that truth is not something independent of 
graspability or possessability by me, a point which threatens an idealism. This threat is deflected, 
however, by recognising that the “me”, i.e. the subject in question, has no content or character: 
there is no way of making a contrast between the subject’s world and what lies outside of it, no way 
for the subject to find content independent of herself and accordingly content to herself. 
The third article on Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, written jointly by Hanne Appelqvist 
and Panu-Matti Pöykkö, discusses Wittgenstein’s early ethics by comparing it with Emmanuel 
Levinas’s ethical thought. Both Wittgenstein and Levinas claim ethics to be a “condition of the 
world”, not explicable by reference to the empirical facts of the world (NB, 77; Levinas 1969, 204, 
212). The authors argue that what motivates Wittgenstein’s and Levinas’s respective accounts is the 
characteristically Kantian contrast they identify between the absolute ethical demand on the one 
hand and the contingency of the facts of the world on the other. As any substantial ethical theses 





grounds of the ethical demand. In this respect, the writers argue, both Wittgenstein and Levinas 
ought to be read as belonging to the Kantian tradition. After indicating the analogous ways in which 
both Wittgenstein and Levinas make use of the Kantian framework, the article explores the main 
difference between the two: while Wittgenstein’s early ethics is grounded in an aesthetic, 
contemplative perspective on the world as a whole, Levinas famously takes the other person to be 
constitutive for the ethical perspective.  
William Child’s article “‘We can go no further’: Meaning, Use, and the Limits of 
Language” examines the limit of language as it appears in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Child’s 
point of origin is Wittgenstein’s later statement about the impossibility of getting outside of 
language by means of language, which marks an important continuity with the views of the 
Tractatus. In Wittgenstein’s later work, the idea is manifest in his denial of the possibility of 
general metaphysical theses about reality, of providing a linguistic characterization of the relation 
between language and the language-independent world, and of the possibility of teaching the use of 
language by means of explanations to someone who does not already master a language. 
Connecting these points to the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism about meaning 
and rules, Child asks whether it is possible to give a substantive and non-circular explanation of 
what it is for someone to follow a particular rule. He argues that, while Wittgenstein ought to be 
read as an anti-reductionist about meaning, his point about meaning as use is not a mere pleonasm. 
Instead, Child argues, Wittgenstein’s position entitles us to demand some account of the relation 
between semantic and non-semantic facts. According to Child, this relation is one of supervenience 
– an interpretation he substantiates by a detailed analysis of Wittgenstein’s arguments presented in 
the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and the Brown Book. 
Leila Haaparanta’s article “Frege, Carnap, and the Limits of Asserting” explores the 
broader philosophical context of the notion of a limit of language by relating the historical positions 





language and logic as calculus, Haaparanta argues that while Frege’s conceptual notation is a 
calculus (in Frege’s own sense of the term), it is also intended as a universal language: everything 
that can be thought can be also be expressed in that notation. Moreover, like Wittgenstein’s early 
denial of the possibility of overcoming logical form in language, Frege’s conceptual notation does 
not allow for a metaperpective from which to compare language with the world. Paying attention to 
Frege’s discussion on different ways of justifying assertions, Haaparanta then raises the question of 
the legitimacy of philosophical assertions. While Frege’s texts do not settle the question, in 
Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” we find a classic example of an argument that 
denies the possibility of metaphysical assertions by appeal to a kind of limit of language, namely, 
Carnap’s notion of a linguistic framework and his distinction between statements internal and 
external to that framework. Haaparanta’s article closes by proposing that Carnap’s discussion of the 
nature of external propositions may be used as an informative point of comparison for 
Wittgenstein’s later remarks on philosophy and philosophical assertions.  
Paul Standish’s article “On Being Resolute” addresses the notion of a limit of language 
against the background of the debate between resolute and traditional interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s thought. Here, the traditional interpretation is understood as putting forth a narrative 
of the early Wittgenstein as an advocate of a realist truth-conditional theory of meaning to be 
replaced by Wittgenstein’s later, anti-realist theory of meaning given by assertability-conditions. 
Such a story, it is argued, not only fails to capture elements of continuity of Wittgenstein thought, 
but commits the early and the later Wittgenstein to the metaphysical assumption of a possibility of 
stepping outside of language. In doing so the traditional view “represent[s] the matter as if there 
were something one couldn’t do”, thus dismissing Wittgenstein’s explicit warning against doing 
just that (PI §374). Rather than taking an explicit stance on the debate, Standish considers the 
inevitability of the urge to overcome the limits as well as the difficulty of returning to the ordinary, 





Heidegger in light of Stanley Cavell’s work, the comparison leading to the acknowledgement of 
limits of language and of the restlessness of the desire to exceed them.   
Yrsa Neuman’s article “Moore’s Paradox and the Limits of Language Use” discusses 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of G. E. Moore’s paradox, namely, the absurdity involved in the utterance 
“It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining”. Wittgenstein’s initial response to the paradox 
consists in conceptual clarification of the grammatical landscapes of belief and first-person and 
second-person ascription and expression, intended to uncover the assumptions underlying the 
paradox. While some of these assumptions seem to indicate the limits of language use, Neuman’s 
discussion shows that instead of aiming to establish or unveil rules of language to rule out the 
Moorean sentence, Wittgenstein’s approach is sensitive to particular cases that may not follow the 
ordinary pattern of language use. Neuman sees this as a central feature of Wittgenstein’s method, 
and argues that Moore’s paradox emerges only when language is approached from the “cold” 
philosophical viewpoint without an actual context; and once a context is provided, there is nothing 
paradoxical about it. Accordingly, she suggests, what needs to be explained is not why the Moorean 
sentence fails, but our urge to philosophize about a mere piece of surface grammar. 
If for the early Wittgenstein the subject of language is a formal I, the later Wittgenstein 
turns to the linguistic community as the subject of language. Sandis’s article “Who are ‘we’ for 
Wittgenstein?” asks how we ought to understand Wittgenstein’s frequent references to “us”. Who 
are we who practice philosophy, who could not understand a lion if it spoke, and whose form of life 
finds expression in language? Sandis addresses such questions by examining Wittgenstein’s later 
usages of “we” and its cognates. According to his analysis, the term sometimes refers to the 
community of philosophers, while at other times it is intended to point to language users, to average 
people, or a specific cultural community. Such groups ought to be contrasted, not just with that of 
all humans in a general sense, but also with a transcendental “we”, as evoked by those 





Hans-Johann Glock’s article “Animal Consciousness – a Limit of Language” discusses 
phenomenal consciousness, which is often deemed a mysterious phenomenon defying naturalistic 
explanation or even conceptual comprehension. Arguing against the corresponding two variants of 
the orthodox view, which he calls (new) mysterianism and (neo-) mysticism respectively, Glock 
defends a deflationist account of consciousness. Drawing in part on Wittgenstein’s later discussion 
on mental phenomena and private language, Glock argues that the sense of a mystery that the 
orthodox positions attribute to phenomenal consciousness does not mark a genuine limit either of 
knowledge or of language but rather results from conceptual confusions. Glock develops his 
argument by discussing the consciousness of non-human animals, thus addressing Ernst Nagel’s 
question “what it it like to be a bat?”. According to Glock, Nagel’s question can in fact be answered 
in an informative and reasonable way by reference to empirical findings concerning the behavioural 
capacities, life form, and environment of bats. The real challenge related to consciousness does not 
pertain to qualia, Glock argues, but to the grounds of attributing intentional states to animals. For 
while it is perfectly possible to ascribe some intentional states to animals based on our knowledge 
of animals and their behavior, there is indeed a limit to such ascriptions, namely of determining the 
precise content of more complex intentional states. However, rather than pointing to ineffable 
animal intentionality, this limit is imposed by our undeniably anthropocentric language as applied to 
creatures that do not talk. 
Pihlström’s article “The Limits of Language in Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion” 
discusses the nature of religious language and belief and the way in which philosophers influenced 
by Wittgenstein’s work, most notably D. Z. Phillips, have approached the theme. Noting the 
uneasiness with which the Wittgenstein tradition of philosophy of religion has regarded the 
metaphor of a limit in Wittgenstein’s writing, Pihlström argues that instead of disarming the notion 
of a limit, we ought to take it as pointing to the Kantian undertones of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 





of religion could be read as transcendental arguments. While religious language is not based on 
empirical evidence, it is still conditioned by the concrete circumstances of our lives and makes 
possible a response to actual human suffering. Considering the problem of evil and the way in 
which it has been treated in the Wittgensteinian tradition, Pihlström argues that Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on religion provide resources for formulating a transcendental version of antitheodicy. 
Guter’s article “Measure for Measure: Wittgenstein’s Critique of the Augustinian Picture 
of Music” discusses Wittgenstein’s later remarks on music, connecting them to Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between memory-time and information-time in his middle period. Guter argues that 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on public information-time as that which conditions or circumscribes 
memory-time sets his conception of musical expression apart from the philosophical tradition that 
originates in Augustine’s discussion of time. Insofar as our utterances about musical experiences 
geared toward the order of memory-time are meaningful, they must rely the framework of our 
ordinary language and its order of information-time. Guter’s discussion brings to surface the 
particularity of expression and the aesthetically “right” in music, evoked by Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on simultaneity and tempo in music and language. According to Guter, the musical practice and its 
collaborative quest for drawing in significance by means of the phrasing and re-phrasing of a 
musical passage to characterize it, ultimately enables distinctions between aesthetic right and 
wrong.  
The collection closes with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s article “Literature as the Measure of 
our Lives”, which discusses the relation between literary language and reality, thereby engaging 
with the debate on realism and idealism in Wittgenstein later thought. Moyal-Sharrock stresses the 
reality-soakedness of language, and argues that its being impacted by the extra-linguistic makes 
language both a vital and an autonomous force. She argues that Wittgenstein’s remarks on literature 
speak to the inseparability of form and content in literature. She takes her clue in Wittgenstein to 





but provides a qualitatively different and invaluable perspective on our lives by showing what 
cannot be said. That is, how we use language aesthetically to evoke what cannot be described or 
referred to veridically, and yet deeply generates or enhances moral and psychological 
understanding. In indicating how the distinction between saying and showing is reflected in 
Wittgenstein’s later discussion of poetry and literature, Moyal-Sharrock’s argument traces an 
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